In this letter, we investigate an intelligent reflecting surface (IRS) assisted wireless secrecy communication system, where an IRS is deployed nearby a single-antenna receiver to assist in the secure transmission from a multi-antenna transmitter, in the presence of multiple single-antenna eavesdroppers. Aiming to maximize the achievable secrecy rate, a design problem for jointly optimizing transmit beamforming with jamming and IRS reflect beamforming is formulated, which is however difficult to solve due to its non-convexity and coupled variables. We thus propose an efficient algorithm based on alternating optimization to solve the problem sub-optimally. Simulation results show that incorporating jamming with artificial noise (AN) in transmit beamforming is generally beneficial to improve the secrecy rate, even under the new setup with IRS reflect beamforming.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, intelligent reflecting surface (IRS) has been proposed as a key enabling technology for achieving a smart and reconfigurable signal propagation environment in future wireless networks [1] - [4] . Specifically, IRS is a metasurface composed of a large number of low-cost passive reflecting elements. By adaptively adjusting the reflection amplitude and/or phase shift of each element at an IRS, the strength and direction of the electromagnetic wave becomes highly controllable, whereby the reflected signal can be intentionally enhanced or weakened at different receivers. Moreover, IRS consumes much less power than traditional active transceivers/relays since it merely reflects signals without injecting any power for amplification [1] . As a new promising solution to achieve high beamforming gain with very low hardware/energy cost, IRS has been applied in various wireless applications such as coverage extension, interference cancellation, energy efficiency enhancement, and so on (see [1] and the references therein).
From the physical layer security perspective, IRS assisted wireless secrecy communication was recently investigated in [1] , [5] - [8] . Via jointly designing the active transmit beamforming and the passive reflect beamforming of the IRS that is usually deployed near the legitimate receiver, the achievable secrecy rate can be significantly improved. However, the above works mainly focused on the joint beamforming design using various different optimization methods, while the transmit jamming with artificial noise (AN) was not considered therein. AN is known to be an effective technique for enhancing the secrecy rate in the conventional wireless system without using the IRS, especially when the number of eavesdroppers is larger than that of transmit antennas. This is because the transmitter in this case lacks sufficient degrees of freedom (DoF) to send the legitimate signal into the null space of all the eavesdroppers' channels, thus rendering the standalone transmit beamforming ineffective [9] . This thus motivates the current work to investigate the joint transmit beamforming with AN and IRS reflect beamforming in an IRS-aided secrecy communication system, as shown in Fig. 1 . We aim to maximize the achievable secrecy rate of the considered system and thereby investigate whether the additional DoF brought by the IRS can have any impact on the necessity of using AN in the joint beamforming design, which, to the authors' best knowledge, has not been addressed in the literature yet.
Notations: C N ×M denotes the space of N × M complexvalued matrices. The distribution of a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variable with mean µ and variance σ 2 is denoted by CN µ, σ 2 ; and ∼ stands for distributed as. For a square matrix S, Tr(S) denotes its trace, while S 0 means that S is positive semi-definite. For any general matrix M, rank(M) denotes its rank. For any complex number x, ∠(x) denotes its phase.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. System Model
As shown in Fig. 1 , we consider a wireless communication system where a legitimate transmitter (Alice) intends to send confidential information to a legitimate receiver (Bob) with the help of an IRS (Rose) that is deployed nearby Bob, against K eavesdroppers (Eves) that are arbitrarily distributed in the system. Suppose that Bob and all Eves are equipped with a single antenna, while the number of antennas at Alice and that of reflecting elements at Rose are denoted by M and N , respectively. The baseband equivalent channels from arXiv:1907.12839v2 [cs.IT] 31 Jul 2019
Alice to Rose, Bob and Eve k (the k-th eavesdropper) are denoted by H ar ∈ C N ×M , h H ab ∈ C 1×M and h H ae k ∈ C 1×M , respectively, while those from Rose to Bob and Eve k are denoted by h H rb ∈ C 1×N and h H re k ∈ C 1×N , respectively. Let Φ = diag e jθ1 , e jθ2 , ...., e jθ N represent the diagonal phase-shifting matrix of Rose, where in its main diagonal, θ n ∈ [0, 2π) is the phase shift on the combined incident signal by its n-th element, n = 1, ..., N [1], [2] . The composite Alice-Rose-Bob/Eve k channel is then modeled as a concatenation of three components, namely, the Alice-Rose link, Rose's reflection with phase shifts, and Rose-Bob/Eve k link. To characterize the performance limit of the considered IRS-assisted secrecy communication system, we assume that the channel state information (CSI) of all channels involved is perfectly known at Alice and Rose for their joint design of transmit/reflect beamforming and jamming [2] . In addition, the quasi-static flat-fading model is assumed for all the channels.
The transmitted signal from Alice is given by
(1) where s ∼ CN (0, 1) and a ∼ CN (0, 1) denote the independent information and jamming/AN signals, respectively, while f 1 ∈ C M ×1 and f 2 ∈ C M ×1 denote the beamforming and jamming vectors, respectively. Assuming that Alice has a maximum transmit power budget P max , we have f H
The signal received at Bob or Eve k is then given by
where n i ∼ CN 0, σ 2 0 is the complex additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN).
where v n = e jθn , ∀n. By changing variables as h H ri ΦH ar = v H H ari where H ari = diag h H ri H ar , the signal-to-interference-plusnoise ratio (SINR) at Bob or Eve k can be derived as
is an arbitrary phase rotation.
B. Problem Formulation
We aim to maximize the achievable secrecy rate via a joint design of the transmit beamforming and jamming at Alice and the reflect beamforming at Rose, subject to the total power constraint at Alice. As such, the optimization problem is formulated as
and R e k = log 2 (1 + γ e k ) are the achievable rates in bits/second/Hertz (bps/Hz) for Bob and Eve k, respectively. (P0) is difficult to solve due to the nonconcave objective function as well as the coupled optimization variables. However, we observe that the resultant problems can be efficiently solved when one of (f 1 , f 2 ) and v is fixed. This thus motivates us to propose an alternating optimization based algorithm to solve (P0) sub-optimally, by iteratively optimizing one of (f 1 , f 2 ) and v with the other being fixed at each iteration until convergence is reached, as detailed in the next section.
III. JOINT DESIGN OF BEAMFORMING AND JAMMING
A. Optimizing f 1 and f 2 for Given v
can be viewed as the effective channels from Alice to Bob and Eve k, respectively, by combining the direct channel and the IRS-reflected channel. Then, (P0) can be transformed to the following problem
Then it follows that F 1 0, F 2 0 and rank(F 1 ) = rank(F 2 ) = 1. Since the rank-1 constraints are non-convex, we apply the semidefinite relaxation (SDR) to relax these constraints. As a result, (P1.1) is reduced to
is the feasible set for (F 1 , F 2 ). However, (P1.2) is still difficult to solve since the objective function is not jointly concave with respect to (w.r.t.) F 1 and F 2 , which are non-trivially coupled too. To overcome these difficulties, we resort to the following lemma [9] .
and the optimal solution is t = 1/x.
Lemma 1 provides an upper bound for ϕ (t), and this bound is tight when t = 1/x. By applying Lemma 1 and setting
where
Similarly, by setting x = γ 0 Tr H e k (F 1 + F 2 ) + 1 and t = t e k , R e k can be expressed as
Algorithm 1: Alternating optimization for solving (P1. and t (m) e k according to (9) and (10), respectively. 5 With given t by solving (P1.5). 6 Update m = m + 1. 7 until the objective value of (P1.1) reaches convergence. 8 Recover f 1 and f 2 from F 1 and F 2 , respectively.
Therefore, following Sion's minimax theorem [10] , (P1.2) can be rewritten as
Note that the constant "ln 2" is omitted in the objective function without loss of optimality. It can be shown that (P1.3) is convex w.r.t. either (F 1 , F 2 ) or (t b , t e k ). Thus, it can be solved by applying the alternating optimization technique.
According to Lemma 1, the optimal (t b , t e k ) for fixed (F 1 , F 2 ) can be easily derived in closed-forms as
On the other hand, the optimal (F 1 , F 2 ) for given t * b , t * e k can be obtained by solving
Introducing a slack variable t, (P1.4) can be equivalently written as (P1.5) : max
Since (P1.5) is convex, it can be efficiently solved by using a convex optimization solver, e.g. CVX. Note that there is no guarantee that the obtained F 1 and F 2 are rank-1 matrices as the rank-1 constraints are dropped in (P1.2) by applying SDR. If the obtained F 1 and F 2 are of rank-1, they can be written as F 1 = w 1 w H 1 and F 2 = w 2 w H 2 by applying eigenvalue decomposition, and then the optimal f 1 and f 2 are given by f 1 = w 1 and f 2 = w 2 , respectively. Otherwise, Gaussian randomization is needed for recovering f 1 and f 2 approximately, for which the details are omitted [2] . In the above, an approximate solution to (P1.1) is obtained by alternately updating (F 1 , F 2 ) and (t b , t e k ), which is summarized in Algorithm 1.
B.
Optimizing v for Given f 1 and f 2 Next, for any given f 1 and f 2 , we denoteh
As a result, (P0) can be simplified as
|v n | = 1, n = 1, ..., N. Similarly as for (P1.1), by applying Lemma 1 together with SDR, the optimization overṽ for given (f 1 , f 2 ) is reduced to
and ψ e k Ṽ , z e k =z e k γ 0 Tr H e k +Ĥ e k Ṽ +1 − ln γ 0 Tr Ĥ e kṼ + 1 − ln z e k − 1. (12)
It can be verified that (P2.2) is convex w.r.t. eitherṼ or (z b , z e k ), with the other being fixed. Similarly, it can be approximately solved by alternately optimizingṼ and (z b , z e k ). For givenṼ, the optimal (z b , z e k ) is given by
While for given z * b , z * e k , the optimalṼ is given bỹ
which can be solved similarly as (P1.5). After extractingṽ fromṼ by eigenvalue decomposition with Gaussian randomization, the reflection coefficients are obtained as v n = e j ∠(ṽ ñ v N +1 ) , n = 1, ..., N, (16) where the constraints |v n | = 1, ∀n, are satisfied.
C. Overall Algorithm
To summarize, the overall iterative algorithm to solve (P0) is given in Algorithm 2, where denotes a small threshold and L is the maximum number of iterations. Algorithm 2: Alternating optimization for solving (P0)
Initialize the reflection coefficients vector as v (0) .
Solve (P1.1) for givenṽ (l−1) by applying Algorithm 1, and denote the solution as f Update l = l + 1. 7 until the fractional decrease of the objective value in (P0) is below or l = L . 8 Recover v fromṽ according to (16).
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
The simulation setups are shown in Fig. 2 . It is assumed that Alice, Rose and Bob are located at (5, 0, 20), (0, 100, 2), and (3, 100, 0) in meter (m), respectively. To study the effect of jamming, we consider two different setups in Fig. 2 where the K Eves lie uniformly along the line from (2, 95, 0) to (2, 105, 0) in Setup (a) and from (2, −105, 0) to (2, −95, 0) in Setup (b), thus corresponding to the cases with local Eves and remote Eves near/from the IRS, respectively.
The channel from i (i ∈ {a, r}) to j (j ∈ {b, e k }) is gener-
g ij , where L 0 = −30 dB denotes the path loss at the reference distance d 0 = 1 m, d ij denotes the distance from i to j, and c ij denotes the corresponding path loss exponent. Besides, the small-scale fading component g ij is assumed to be Rician fading and given by
where β ij is the Rician factor, while g LoS ij and g NLoS ij represent the deterministic line-of-sight (LoS) and Rayleigh fading/non-LoS (NLoS) components, respectively. The same channel model is adopted for H ar . We assume that the channels from Alice to Bob, Rose, and Eve k have no LoS component and experience Rayleigh fading with the path loss exponents and Rician factors being set as c ab = c ae k = 5 and β ab = β ae k = β ar = 0. Considering that Rose is deployed vertically higher than Bob and Eves, a less scattering environment is expected and thus we set c ar = 3.5. In Setup (a), we assume that the channels from Rose to Bob and Eve k are LoS. The corresponding path loss exponents and Rician factors are set as c rb = c re k = 2 and β rb = β re k = ∞. While in Setup (b), we assume that the channel from Rose to Eve k experiences Rayleigh fading, i.e. c re k = 5 and β re k = 0. The other parameters are set as follows: σ 2 0 = −105 dBm, = 10 −3 and L = 40.
In addition to the proposed design for the case with IRS and AN (AN, IRS), other cases including with AN but without IRS (AN, No-IRS) [9] , with IRS but without AN (No-AN, IRS), and without both IRS and AN (No-AN, No-IRS) are also adopted for performance comparison. Note that by setting f 2 = 0 (i.e., the case of No-AN, IRS) and K = 1, the setup is the same as that considered in [5] .
The achievable secrecy rate versus the transmit power of Alice is plotted in Fig. 3 . It can be observed that as the transmit power increases, the AN-aided designs outperform their counterparts without AN, for both the cases with and without the IRS in both Setups (a) and (b). Note that the achievable secrecy rates for both Setups (a) and (b) are identical for the cases without IRS due to the symmetry of Eves' locations at the two sides of Alice. In fact, as P max goes to ∞,
converges to a constant, which implies that increasing transmit power alone is inefficient for improving R s and incorporating AN is beneficial. Fig. 4 shows the secrecy rate gains achieved by using AN with increasing the number of Eves, K. Note that when K = 1, the secrecy rates with and without AN are almost the same, regardless of whether IRS is used or not. This is expected because the number of transmit antennas is much larger than that of Eves and thus transmit beamforming has sufficient spatial DoF to suppress the signal in the Eves' direction, rendering the use of AN unnecessary. However, as the number of Eves increases, transmit beamforming lacks sufficient DoF for signal nulling and thus it becomes more beneficial to allocate part of transmit power to send jamming signal for degrading the reception of Eves. Interestingly, in Setup (a), it is observed that the case of (AN, No-IRS) even outperforms that of (No-AN, IRS) when K ≥ 6. This implies that, in this more challenging setup with both Bob and Eves near Rose (IRS), AN is particularly useful, as the additional DoF provided by IRS may be insufficient to prevent the information leakage to Eves due to their proximity to the IRS as Bob. Fig. 5 depicts the achievable secrecy rate versus the number of reflecting elements of the IRS, N . It is observed that even with IRS, the AN-aided design requires less reflecting elements to achieve the same secrecy rate as compared to the No-AN design. It is also observed that the performance gain by using AN decreases with increasing N in Setup (a), while it remains almost unchanged in Setup (b). This is expected since in Setup (a), more DoF become available for the passive beamforming of the IRS with larger N to degrade the reception at the Eves, which thus renders the use of AN less effective. However, when the Eves are far away from the IRS in Setup (b), the reflect beamforming of the IRS is fully exploited to enhance the desired signal at the Bob's receiver, but without the need of nulling/canceling the signals at the Eves that are out of its coverage. As a result, the performance gain due to AN is roughly constant regardless of N .
Finally, it is observed from Figs. 3-5 that Setup (b) always achieves higher secrecy rate than Setup (a) for the case with IRS, regardless of whether AN is used or not. The reason is that in Setup (a), the Eves are in the same local region as Bob covered by Rose (IRS), and as a result it becomes more challenging to degrade the reception of the Eves, for the design of both transmit beamforming with/without AN and reflect beamforming of the IRS.
V. CONCLUSION
In this letter, we proposed a joint design of transmit/reflect beamforming with AN to secure an IRS-aided wireless communication system in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. We developed an alternating optimization based algorithm to solve this design problem efficiently and showed by simulations the scenarios where the joint use of IRS and AN is most beneficial, to provide useful insights for practical system design.
